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IDEOLOGY AND OPPORTUNITY IN SOCIAL WORK DURING
THE NEW DEAL YEARS
Norma Kolko Phillips, D.S.W., Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology and Social Work
Herbert H. Lehman College, City University of New York
ABSTRACT
As the country moved from a dominant ideology of
voluntarism towards the welfare state during the New
Deal years, conflicts and compromises occurred within
the social work profession that required a definition
of the role the profession would assume with relation
to the public sector of social welfare. The nature of
the relationship that evolved between social work and
government, and the accommodations made by each during
the New Deal years, and particularly around the pas-
sage of the Social Security Act of 1935, are examined.
INTRODUCTION
The failure of market mechanisms to provide
employment and opportunities for economic self-
sufficiency for all "able-bodied" people was a major
component in the social unrest of the Great Depression
and produced critical changes in attitudes of the
Federal government towards public and private rights
and responsibilities. With the passage of the Social
Security Act of 1935, the Federal government made its
first commitment to permanent involvement with social
welfare problems, bringing the social work profession
and the Federal government together in a long-term
mutual concern for social welfare. This new sponsor-
ship of social welfare programs put the Federal
government in the position to offer social work an
expansion of professional jurisdiction, including
opportunities for jobs. It was at this juncture that
the profession had to define its priorities and make
clear its position in relation to federal policy and
251
it was here that social work ideologies were formu-
lated through intense professional conflict and
compromise. 1  This paper will explore the nature of
the relationship which developed between social work
and the Federal government around the New Deal social
welfare programs, culminating in the Social Security
Act of 1935. This relationship has been crucial to
the determination of the scope, direction, values, and
goals of social work during the past fifty years, and
is again challenged in the debates sparked by Reagan
administration policy. The following questions will
be addressed:
1. What were the conflicts and compromises
within the profession during the New Deal
years and what accommodations were made in
relation to the Federal government?
2. What influence did the profession have on
public policy?
3. Which values were lost, and which were gained
as social work accepted the partnership with
the Federal government; how did this influ-
ence the direction of the profession?
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE SOCIAL WORK -
GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP
Throughout American history one sees a pattern of
slow and uneven movement toward expanded federal
involvement in social welfare. These shifts, in turn,
created changing roles for social work after the pro-
fessions's birth at the beginning of the 20th century.
Although the tradition of the English Poor Law,
brought to this country by the earliest settlers,
introduced the principle of government involvement
with social welfare, it kept minimal the responsibil-
ity that the government assumed for meeting the needs
of the poor in the New World. Government tended to
follow the ideology of privatism, which can be defined
as individual rather than societal responsibility for
creating, experiencing, and alleviating poverty.
Privatism continued as the dominant ideology until
the 1920s. Only in times of crises, when social and
political systems were threatened, did the government
extend its role in alleviating social welfare
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problems, as, for example in the formation of the
Freedmen's Bureau in the Civil War period (Olds,
1963). The belief that poverty was associated with
immorality and individual failure rather than with the
nature of the economic system was founded on the
American myth that opportunities existed for economic
success, and the individual was responsible for his
own economic distress. During the late 19th century,
while privatism was dominant, social work developed in
divergent directions represented by the Charity
Organization Societies and the Settlement House move-
ment, with the former assuming individual respon-
sibility, and the latter societal responsibility for
the causes of poverty and its solutions.
During the 1920s, when the United States had seen
the dramatic economic and social changes brought about
by industrialization and increased corporate power,
privatism was challenged and voluntarism, advocated by
Herbert Hoover during that decade, took hold as the
dominant ideology in the country. Based on the
assumption that poverty was a result of the structure
of the economic system rather than individual moral
failure, voluntarism represented a significant shift
from the earlier thinking. Along with this new under-
standing of the causes of poverty came a broader view
of the responsibilities of the society to provide
opportunities for people (Hoover, 1922). Although the
Federal government was in no way seen as a provider of
income or social services, it was seen as the protec-
tor of citizens and to this end government intervened
by encouraging the development of cooperative institu-
tions, including trade associations, professional
societies, and organizations of farmers and laborers
(Hawley, 1974; 117-118; Burner, 1979). The 1920s also
saw the development of welfare capitalism in America,
another form of voluntarism, based on the premise of
mutuality of interests between labor and management
(Brandes, 1970: 26-28).
Hoover's applications of voluntarism as a solu-
tion to massive suffering linked social work and
government during the early years of the Great
Depression. He maintained that if self-reliance and
self-respect were to survive, private charity and
local government rather than the Federal government
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must assume responsibility for funding and administer-
ing social welfare programs. At this point in history
the Federal government and the society as a whole
turned to social work agencies to take on responsibil-
ity for distributing relief funds. By 1931, as mass
need increased, more and more people were turning to
social workers in family agencies for financial help.
STRUGGLES WITHIN SOCIAL WORK DURING THE EARLY YEARS
OF THE DEPRESSION
The first winter of the Great Depression saw
social work sharing with many other groups the belief
that the economy would soon improve (Bruno, 1957:
300-30).2 In spite of the increase in unemployment
that began with the economic disaster of 1929, it was
not until 1931 that the Proceedings of the National
Conference on Charities and Corrections reflect the
concern of social workers about widespread
unemployment. During the early 1930s, as the severity
of the economic and social conditions was becoming
apparent to more and more social workers, the process
of re-establishing the historical connection between
the social work profession and the task of relieving
poverty began.
Consequently, two major conflicts arose within
the profession. First, in response to public
pressure, social work reluctantly downgraded the
importance of the counseling function which had been
highly valued by family agencies during the 1920s and
began the shift to assuming the function of relieving
poverty once again. In addition, the profession
struggled with the question of Federal government
responsibility for relief. In the early Depression
years, only some social workers supported federal
grants to states for unemployment relief. Others con-
tinued to see local government and local charities as
the appropriate sources for relief. 3  As economic
conditions continued to worsen, social work became
more unified in its position, supporting federal
responsibility for providing relief and advocating
more strongly for work relief. In an article in the
Survey in April 1931, Mary van Kleeck, of the
Department of Industrial Studies of the Russell Sage
Foundation and an outspoken social work leader,
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criticized President Hoover's veto of the Wagner bill,
which called for a national employment service. At
its annual meeting that year, the American Association
of Social Workers (AASW) appointed a Committee on
Unemployment to collect information on unemployment
from local chapters and publicize it, to consider
unemployment insurance and more adequate funding of
relief, and to further consider federal funding of
relief.
4
Although more and more social workers supported
Federal government intervention in social welfare pol-
icy and programs, it was by no means the dominant
attitude within the profession and it was not until
1932, three years into the Depression, that AASW gave
its support to the Costigan-LaFollette bill providing
for federal grants to the states for unemployment
relief, thereby officially endorsing the principle of
federal responsibility for this program (Fisher, 1980:
39-40). 5
A group of radical social workers organized what
became known as the Rank-and-File movement in 1931.
They believed the Depression was the result of a
breakdown in the old economic order and that only the
replacement of the old social order with one based on
public ownership of resources of the nation, and a
planned and rational use of these resources would
bring it to an end. The movement opposed the politi-
cal position of the social work establishment which,
it claimed, was committed to the preservation of the
status quo and was deferential to the conservative
views of businessmen who assumed positions of leader-
ship in social work agencies. Although most people in
the movement were not Communist Party members, their
disillusionment with Hoover's policies and with the
ability of social work leaders to propose plans to
meet the needs of the unemployed, led to what Jacob
Fisher referred to as a "fascination" with Communist
thinking. In addition to discussions of social prob-
lems and participation in political activities, the
Rank-and-File movement sponsored a journal, Social
Work Today, which provided a forum for voices of
reform thought during the critical years of 1932-1942
(see Fisher, 1980: 91-100).
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SOCIAL WORK AND THE PROMISE OF RECOVERY AT
THE PRICE OF REFORM
In February 1934, a year after Franklin D.
Roosevelt took office, the first AASW Delegate
Conference, also referred to as the Conference on
Governmental Objectives for Social Work, met for the
purpose of integrating the work of government on all
levels with that of social work.6  Both the AASW
establishment and the radical faction were heard, the
former advocating recovery of the economy and the lat-
ter urging reform of capitalism.7
Speaking at the 1934 meeting was Harry Hopkins,
who headed the New Deal Federal Emergency Relief
Administration (FERA) and who previously had headed
Roosevelt's Temporary Emergency Relief Administration
in New York State. Also a social worker, Hopkins
appealed to AASW to support current governmental
actions. Hopkins identified Roosevelt's goals with
those of social work, focusing on the President's
interest in increasing the degree of planning in the
economy and his desire to create a structure to pro-
vide securit for the unemployed, the elderly, and
handicapped.
At the same conference, Harry Lurie, of the
Bureau of Jewish Social Research, represented the
radical social work position that the intention of the
New Deal was not change but recovery--"restoration of
our present industrial and agricultural system so that
it might function again as it did in the reign of
Mr. Roosevelt's predecessors." He interpreted
Roosevelt's cuts of the emergency welfare programs of
the New Deal as surrendering to the pressures from
industry which feared that permanent programs would
challenge the private ownership system. Lurie encour-
aged social workers to take a stand in opposition to
the President and to urge the formation of programs
designed to alter the distribution of wealth (Delegate
Conference, 1934: 240-253).
Although the recommendations of the 1934 Delegate
Conference were aimed at influencing federal policy in
the direction of more substantial relief programs,
they did not support the major policy revisions urged
by Harry Lurie. For example, the Conference endorsed
the Wagner-Lewis bill, which would have established
256
state systems of unemployment insurance providing
seven dollars a week for a maximum of ten weeks,
rather than the more liberal Lundeen bill, which would
have provided compensation to the unemployed on a
level equal to the average local wage for similar
work. The Conference's recommendation was that mini-
mum benefits and the period of compensation under the
Wagner-Lewis bill be increased.
In her address, "Our Illusions Regarding
Government," delivered at the 1934 National Conference
of Social Work, Mary van Kleeck criticized the 1934
Delegate Conference, saying that the social work pro-
fessional association "had committed itself to identi-
fication with the present administration, to
endorsement of . . . its principles." Van Kleeck
urged social workers to surrender their "illusions
regarding government" as representing all the people
and to recognize that "government tends to protect
property rights rather than human rights." She
claimed that by failing to approach poverty as a con-
sequence of the economic system, the government
avoided making basic changes in -the economic system.
She encouraged social workers to give up their nonpar-
tisan position, pointing out that failure to make com-
mitments to principles can result in a defense of the
status quo. Van Kleeck suggested that social workers
refuse positions in public social welfare agencies if
the positions required that they serve as apologists
of the government (Proceedings, 1934: 474-484).9
FERA'S OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOCIAL WORK EXPANSION
In spite of this warning, by 1934 social work was
already heavily involved in the new government relief
programs. FERA's decision that public funds should be
administered by nonpartisan public officials marked
the start of the expansion of the public sector of
social work, bringing with it a vast enlargement in
the jurisdiction of the profession. FERA was able to
spend large sums of money to employ as many social
workers as could be found. Social workers were hired
to work on all levels, ranging from investigators to
administrators of FERA's Social Service Division,
implementing the government's programs and interpret-
ing them to the community. Hopkins had said, "'I want
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at least one competent social worker in every district
office in America'" (Kurzman, 1974: 174-176). Paul
Kurzman has stated of this remark, "and thus in one
sentence, the die surely had been cast. All over the
country, where there never had been a sign of a social
worker before, social workers suddenly appeared"
(Kurzman, 1974: 174). The demand created a growth
spurt for social work education as well, and early in
1934, Hopkins earmarked funds from FERA for states to
send their relief workers to accredited graduate
schools of social work, strengthening the professional
base of social work. Between 1930 and 1940 the
number of professional social workers almost doubled
(Kurzman, 1974: 175). 10
Although futile in its efforts to retain FERA,
the profession did speak out in unison against
Roosevelt's announcement in his State-of-the-Union
address that "the Federal Government must and shall
quit this business of relief" in the beginning of
1935. FERA was to be terminated and the Works
Progress Administration (WPA) created as an alterna-
tive work relief program. It was anticipated by the
Roosevelt administration that the categorical aid pro-
gram of the proposed Social Security bill would meet
the needs of the aged, the blind, and of dependent
children needing relief, and Roosevelt proposed that
total responsibility for relief for those not covered
by WPA or the social security programs be returned to
states and localities. Although AASW welcomed the
categorical aid programs, it feared that some states
would not have sufficient resources, administrative
tools, or in some cases even the necessary legislation
to take on responsibility for the needy who fell bet-
ween WPA and the categorical assistance provisions of
the proposed social security program. AASW considered
it essential that a general relief or general assis-
tance title be added to the proposed social security
bill to provide for families who fell between WPA and
the categorical assistance programs.11 At stake, as
well, were the self-interests of the profession, which
had benefited from its involvement in the administra-
tion of FERA (Compass, 1935: 3-6; see Fisher, 1980:
58-59).
In many chapters of AASW, protest meetings
were held and telegrams sent to President Roosevelt
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opposing the termination of federal grants for public
assistance. The executive secretary of AASW, Walter
West, sent a telegram to Roosevelt urging the continu-
ation of federal grants to states. The Division on
Governmeent and Social Work of AASW suggested, and the
executive committee of the association accepted, the
recommendation to adopt a resolution calling on the
Federal government to resume its responsibility for
providing grants to states for general assistance.
According to this recommendation, such a plan would be
administered by the newly appointed Social Security
Board (Fisher, 1980: 62).
FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE PROVISIONS OF
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
Although two social workers, Frances Perkins and
Harry Hopkins, were highly influential in formulating
the Social Security Act, their activities cannot be
viewed as representative of the participation of the
social work profession in the accomplishment of that
legislation. 12  To the contrary, the profession was
both distracted and torn by various factions and was
unable to function effectively as a pressure group to
influence it. 13 In addition, social work was absorbed
by the issue of the withdrawal of FERA funds during
1935 and consequently debate within the profession
about the Social Security Act, both in its planning
stages and after its passage in August 1935, was
scarce (see a non-evaluative article, Bond, 1935:
7-10).
During that year, the Compass emphasized profes-
sional issues related to the introduction of the pub-
lic sector in social work, such as the establishment
of professional standards, analyses of membership in
AASW, education for social work, and the question of
the relationship of public relief workers to the pro-
fession. Even before the Social Security Act was
passed the radical group of social workers also had
turned its interests towards professional issues
rather than issues of social welfare policy. Few
articles appeared in Social Work Today challenging the
various controversial aspects of the Social Security
bill. 14  Both journals featured articles concerning
the professional standing of public relief workers and
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the role of social work in public welfare programs.
In addition, Social Work Today addressed the issue of
labor unions for social workers--a movement which the
radical group initiated.
The AASW Delegate Conference in 1935 was devoted
to the various controversial aspects of the Economic
Security program, later renamed the Social Security
Act. Opinions of the members in this group varied
widely. Most of the speakers at the Conference pref-
aced their suggestions for change with recognition and
admiration for the advances the bill symbolized.
Others were clear in their support for the President's
program and declined to suggest changes (Delegate
Conference, 1935: 149-50, 235-236). Radical social
workers, including Mary van Kleeck, took a position in
support of the provisions of the Lundeen bill as the
preferred plan for unemployment insurance. Linton
Swift of the Family Welfare Association of America
advocated putting pressure on the Federal government
for change. He warned that if an economic system can-
not meet the test of providing an adequate working
income to all classes of the population, then "we must
develop a different system. It becomes a question in
the minds of many of us as to when you apply that
test" (Delegate Conference, 1935: 19-20).
The Conference could not resolve differences and
no recommendations for changes in the Economic
Security bill were made (Delegate Conference, 1935:
22-23). Bertha Reynolds commented on this lack of
participation in her article, "Whom do Social Workers
Serve?" which appeared in Social Work Today in May
1935. Reynolds said:
For a social worker to deny that there is a
class struggle today is to confess to an
ignorance of what is going on so appalling
that it amounts to a confession of unwill-
ingness to know. As the opportunities to
know beat more insistently upon our ears
each day, such unwillingness comes more and
more to mean participation on the side of
maintaining privilege and exploitation, with
all its frightful toll of human life (1935:
5-7,34).
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EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOCIAL WORK
In its final form, the Social Security Act of
1935 was a legislative compromise responsive to the
complexities of the economic and political conditions
of the Great Depression. As with most compromises, it
was the result of pressures from special interest
groups representing conflicting values. A fundamental
objective was the restoration of confidence in the
Roosevelt administration and in the existing economic
and social system.
Legitimized by the Supreme Court in May 1937
through the Helvering v. Davis decision, the Social
Security Act signified the Federal government's com-
mitment to responsibility for the general welfare
(Helvering v. Davis, 1937). With this decision, the
Court established a legal basis for the ideology of
the welfare state. This critical decision has been
described as altering "the future course of social
welfare in the United States" (Pumphrey and Pumphrey,
1961: 433).
From the point of view of social work, the social
insurances and the public assistance and child welfare
titles of the new legislation provided additional
opportunities for professional growth by expanding the
area of influence of the profession and making perma-
nent the new job opportunities and demands for
increased education. The 1930 census counted 31,000
"social welfare workers" while there were 70,000 in
1940. The increase of 117% was greater than that of
any other professional group during this period. 15 It
is estimated, however, that there were actually
150,000 people employed in social work in 1939 in
either a professional or semiprofessional capacity.16
With this rapid expansion of employment opportunities
and lack of qualified people to fill the new posi-
tions, seventeen new schools of social work were
established during the decade, bringing the total to
forty (Fisher, 1980: 235).
Changes were required in social work as well as
the government as both joined in common tasks. In
addition to the need to further define the social
work-government relationship, social work was pre-
sented with complex tasks, such as redefining the
function of private agencies, coordinating the roles
of public and private agencies, assimilating public
welfare agencies and their social work staffs into the
profession, determining the extent of the involvement
of the profession in the public sector of social
welfare, and clarifying the role that the profession
would officially assume in social action. Conflicts
and opportunities emerged as social workers debated
these issues (see for example Swift, 1936: 282-283,
350; Swift, 1937: 10; Hodson, 1938: 33; Belsley, 1936:
9-10; Klein, 1936: 5-7).17
During the years following passage of the Social
Security Act, social work continued its concern with
federal legislation. AASW made recommendations for
expansion of a federal work program and a non-
categorical public assistance program, and the radical
social work group as well continued to pressure for
liberalization of the Social Security Act.
However, within a few years attention turned from
ideology to optimizing opportunities for social work.
By 1940, AASW had abandoned its demand for a general
assistance title under the Social Security Act or for
the alternative plan of a comprehensive public assis-
tance title for all needy people and gave wholehearted
support to the administration's social welfare
programs. Social Work Today became increasingly
involved in discussion of unionism for social workers
at the expense of working towards legislative changes.
The American Public Welfare Association, which in 1936
had advocated that a general assistance title be
included in the Social Security Act, also went along
with the administration. The organization's director,
Frank Bane, was selected to be executive director of
the Social Security Board, and that organization and
the Federal government became "partners in a common
enterprise" (Fisher, 1980: 179-180). For the main-
stream of the profession the struggle--the cause--was
over and it addressed itself instead to the details of
the new problems centering around implementation and
professionalization that were introduced by the pas-
sage of the Social Security Act. Social work recon-
ciled itself to the social welfare programs of the
administration, supported them, and accepted the opp-
ortunities it was offered.
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CONCLUSIONS: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN
SOCIAL WORK IDEOLOGY
The Social Security Act of 1935, signifying the
movement from voluntarism to the introduction of the
welfare state in this country, marks that point of
qualitative change when, finally, there could be no
retreat from the assumption of federal responsibility
for "the general welfare." By the time the Act was
passed the Depression was into its sixth year. The
pervasiveness and severity of the Depression extended
beyond previous economic crises. The severity and
extent of social distress disputed the viability of
privatism and voluntarism; it both required and
enabled approaches towards resolution that were beyond
the scope of what previously had been done in the area
of social welfare in this country. With the passage
of the Social Security Act and its hearings in the
Supreme Court, the new conception of government's
responsibility for the general welfare was broadened,
legitimized, and made permanent, paving the way for
additional legislation and further development toward
the welfare state.
Growing out of its own history, social work was a
natural "partner" with government as these changes
occurred. This growing involvement of social work
with government dovetailed with the process of pro-
fessionalization. As the institution of social wel-
fare gained complexity, so did the tasks of the social
work profession. Herbert Hoover had linked social
work and government during the early years of the
Great Depression in his request that social workers
assume the task of raising and distributing charitable
funds. This assignment of relief-giving functions was
carried on by Roosevelt. In this latter period, as
the profession became involved in the public as well
as the private sector of social welfare, these func-
tions became institutionalized.
Social workers were firmly entrenched in the pub-
lic relief system by the time the Social Security Act
was proposed, and continued to work in the administra-
tion and delivery of the public assistance titles of
the new legislation. The question of how to satisfy
both the occupational and the professional aspects of
the profession arose for social work in the 1930s and
has continued until today.
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When the New Deal programs began, social work was
well on its way to achieving the status of a profes-
sion including a commitment to community interest and
an ethical system. It functioned as both a political
interest and pressure group, and insofar as it aimed
to improve its own status, it also met the criteria of
an occupational interest and pressure group. Armand
Mauss has pointed out that political and occupational
interests may overlap (1975: 12-15). Conflicts arose
within the social work profession in the 1930s as the
functions of pressuring for political change and
striving to expand professional jurisdiction at times
worked against each other. It was at this juncture
that a price had to be paid by the social work pro-
fession, either in ideology or in opportunity.
The choice was determined by the needs of the
profession for sanction. M. S. Larson has pointed out
that a profession's values and goals will be accept-
able and sanctioned by society only if they appeal to
the values of the dominant ideology. The quest for
sanction and power, which ultimately derives from a
profession's connections with government, precludes
persistent and serious challenges to government poli-
cies (1977: 157-158,226).
Conflict arises for a profession-occupation
which, insofar as it is a profession, is responsible
to act in the interest of clients, including political
action, and insofar as it is an occupation, needs to
protect occupational self interests, including advan-
cement of status. The moderate position that AASW
assumed in relation to government policy and legisla-
tion during the New Deal years best fits the model of
the occupational interest group.
The concept of feedback as a professional func-
tion, as discussed by Louis Levitt, bridges the
functions of the social work profession and the
institution of social welfare:
The two concepts are reciprocal, each inter-
twined with the other in a constantly inter-
acting relationship, each influencing the
other. The institution's constant unfolding
of newly legitimated social needs evokes new
services as the profession feeds back to
society its continuing discovery of the pat-
terning of social hurt emanating from its
practice experience. (1980: 637)
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Viewing the function of feedback as a cornerstone
to the relationship between the social work pro-
fession and the institution of social welfare also
introduces balance between the preservation of occupa-
tional interests and the maximization of professional
objectives.
As social work grew in numbers and influence, it
became a critical force in advancing social welfare
activities involving government interest and funding.
As an organized entity the profession did not advocate
radical reform but both social work and government
accommodated to each other. This stance has required
an integration of the concepts of cause and function
in the profession. Harold Lewis has suggested that it
is the dynamic relationship between cause and function
that shapes service. He defines service "as the
evolving form and substance of the unity and conflict
of cause in function, necessitating the constant
addressing of both sides of this conflict if positive
social change is to be achieved" (1977: 24).
The recent challenges to social welfare programs
in this country reflect renewed and increased conflict
between the values of the dominant society and social
work. Attitudes in the society and the social work
profession are shifting and roles are redefined as
voluntarism and privatism are reawakened. We can
reflect back to Bertha Reynolds, writing in 1936,
"There will never be money enough for relief while the
richest country in the world places the burden of
taxation so disproportionately, not where there is
ability to pay but where there is inability to pro-
test" (1936: 12). Once again the profession must
confront the obsolete ideologies of privatism and
voluntarism as they again are called upon by the
Reagan administration. Now, too, the profession must
determine how it will move to sustain permanent
Federal government involvement in promotion of the
general welfare.
NOTES
ITheodorson and Theodorson have stated that when
the term "ideology" was introduced at the beginning of
the 19th century, it referred to the study of ideas.
However, it soon took on its present meaning of "a set
of ideas justifying particular interests" (1969: 195).
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2Samuel Eliot Morison wrote of the 1929 crash,
"No nation ever faced a business decline more opti-
mistically than America did this one. Nobody highly
placed in government or finance admitted the existence
of a depression for six months or more after the
crash" (The Oxford History of the American People,
Vol. 3, 1972: 291).
3However, later in 1930, statements were made by
the Executive Committee of the American Association of
Social Workers to the effect that the resources of
government and industry, rather than philanthropy and
voluntarism, would be necessary to cope with the
national emergency (see Fisher, 1980: 34-35). During
the same year, Linton Swift, Executive Secretary of
the Family Welfare Association, urged that a greater
proportion of relief should be publicly funded
(Chambers, 1963: 192).
4 For example, the settlement workers, who favored
federal aid to state and local governments for relief,
took initiative by stimulating and guiding social pro-
test and moved toward direct political action. In
1931, the Unemployed Committee of the National
Federation of Settlements published the widely-read
Case Studies of Unemployment, describing 150 cases in
which unemployment was seen as a result of industrial
rather than individual causes, and which stressed the
human cost of unemployment. Around the same time,
articles urging social workers to look more closely at
the social insurances began to appear in the Compass.
Unemployment insurance in the U.S., which was in
the form of the dole, was contrasted to the social
insurances provided in Europe (Fisher, 1980: 35,
39-40).
5 Concerning work relief, the Association for
Improving the Conditions of the Poor sponsored a pri-
vately supported work relief project as early as 1930
(Chambers, pp. 194-195). The American Association of
Public Welfare Officials refused to take a stand on
the issue of federal grants to states for unemployment
relief (Fisher, 1980: 42-43).
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6The "Proceedings" of the American Association
of Social Workers referred to in this paper are
located in the Library of the National Association of
Social Workers in Washington, D.C.
7Shortly after the 1934 AASW Delegate
Conference, Social Service Review reported of the
Conference:
In its early days there was danger that the
Association might be too much like a narrow
kind of trade union. . . . The Washington
meeting, in many ways, constitutes a land-
mark in our professional history. In a time
of national crisis, the delegates of the
Association accepted their responsibility in
regard to national planning and the
necessity of formulating clearly the govern-
mental objectives in social welfare. There
is assurance that clear thinking to for-
mulate policies that are in the interests of
the poor clients whose case and cause we
represent and courage to defend those poli-
cies should be a part of the new tradition
that is in the making. (1934: 145-146)
8 President Roosevelt was quoted in 1934 as
saying, "Social workers and I have the same objectives
in common--social justice for everyone" (Compass,
1934: 6).
9Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in his book, The Age
Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval reported a spec-
tator at van Kleeck's address at the 1934 National
Conference as saying, "'Never in a long experience of
conferences has this observer witnessed such a pro-
longed ovation'" (1960: 194).
10The efforts of Sophonisba Breckinridge, the
president of the American Association of Schools of
Social Work, ensured that the training of personnel
for FERA was carried out in accredited professional
schools with aid from federally funded scholarships,
rather than in brief training courses for emergency
relief workers. Edith Abbott, then dean of the School
of Social Service Administration at the University of
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Chicago, noted that not only were standards main-
tained, but because of publicity of the new oppor-
tunities in public welfare, of which college graduates
had not been previously well informed, and because of
lack of other employment opportunities, requirements
for admission were actually raised (Costin, 1983:
227-228).
llSocial work reformers were concerned that WPA
assistance, unemployment compensation, and old age
pension were all tied to work, with no federal aid for
the millions of able-bodied unemployed who were also
dependent on relief (Bremer, 1984: 166-167).
12Hopkins and Perkins both made important and
controversial recommendations to the President during
the process of formulating the Social Security
program. Hopkins suggested to Roosevelt that social
security and relief be combined so that relief would
be given as a matter of right. Roosevelt rejected the
proposal, maintaining that although the relief system
and the social insurance system often applied to the
same people, the two systems should be kept separate.
A relief program, Roosevelt believed, should be tempo-
rary and should end as soon as business and employment
opportunities revived, while he envisioned employment
insurance and old age insurance as permanent parts of
the economy (Schlesinger, Jr., 1953: 303-304).
Concerning Hopkins' attempt to include relief as a
part of the institutional social welfare system,
Frances Perkins reported that Roosevelt "saw that this
would be the very thing he had been saying he was
against for years -- the dole" (Perkins, 1946:
284-285).
Another of the many controversial issues around
the Social Security program had to do with the deci-
sion to fund social security insurances through
employee contributions. Frances Perkins was amongst
the many who raised objection to this, preferring that
it be paid out of general tax revenues. With amazing
foresight, Roosevelt saw this as a political decision
rather than an economic one. He believed that public
insurance should be a self-supporting system financed
out of contributions and special taxes instead of
general revenues. Years later, in response to a
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complaint about employee contributions, Roosevelt
said:
I guess you're right on the economics, but
those taxes were never a problem of econo-
mics. They are politics all the way
through. We put those payroll contributions
there so as to give the contributors a
legal, moral, and political right to collect
their pensions and their unemployment
benefits. With those taxes in there, no
damn politician can ever scrap my social
security program. (Quoted in Schlesinger,
Jr., 1958: 308-309).
13William Bremer maintains that except for Mary
van Kleeck and Harry Lurie, the group of New York
influential social workers supported the conservative
tone of the New Deal's social programs (Bremer, 1984:
173).
14 See for example the challenging article by
Dorothy Douglas in Social Work Today, "Unemployment
Insurance -- For Whom?" in which she concluded that
the Lundeen bill was far superior to the Social
Security bill. Of the latter, she said:
At every step the supposed object of the
Bill has increasingly been ignored. At
every step each real safeguard for the 'se-
curity' of the workers had cynically been
thrust aside, at every step increasing
concern has been shown for each new device
for the employers' immediate interests, at
every step there has been more effective
insistence upon saving the wealthy taxpayer
at all costs (Douglas, 1935: 9-12, 34).
A similar point of view was taken in an unsigned
article, "New Deal Security" (Social Work Today, 1935:
3-4).
15These figures excluded nonprofessional em-
ployees of social agencies, such as case aides and
others who conducted initial interviews with appli-
cants for relief or assisted with forms needed to
determine eligibility (Fisher, 1980: 235).
269
16This number included newly recruited and
untrained people working in the new or expanded local
public welfare departments, and professional social
workers who worked in FERA and its state and local
divisions, in WPA and local work-relief programs in
the Bureau of Public Assistance after the creation of
the Social Security Board in 1935, and with the
federal Children's Bureau, which was enlarged and
strengthened (from Marion Hathaway, Trade Union
Organization for Professional Workers, United Office
and Professional Workers of America, CIO, 1939, in
Fisher, 1980: 235).
17During 1936, a plea for social action was made
by Harry Lurie:
Whether the Democrats or the Republicans
achieve political power at the next election,
the new Administration will be reinforced in
the desire to quit the 'relief business.'
There is nothing to prevent such a step
except an aroused and organized movement of
all elements who are in sympathy with the
unemployed and who adhere to economic
theories which will not make economic reco-
very dependent upon reduction of wages, stan-
dards, workers' insecurity and destruction of
relief provisions (Lurie, 1936: 5-8).
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